Friday, November 20, 2009

High-Income Americans to Pay for Afghan War Cost

By Viola Gienger


Nov. 20 (Bloomberg) -- Carl Levin, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said higher-income Americans should be taxed to pay for additional troops sent to Afghanistan and that NATO should provide half of the new soldiers.

An “additional income tax to the upper brackets, folks earning more than $200,000 or $250,000,” could fund more troops, Levin, a Michigan Democrat, said in an interview for Bloomberg Television’s “Political Capital With Al Hunt,” airing this weekend. White House Budget Director Peter Orszag has estimated that each additional soldier in Afghanistan could cost $1 million, for a total that could reach $40 billion if 40,000 more troops are added.

That cost, Levin said, should be paid by wealthier taxpayers. “They have done incredibly well, and I think that it’s important that we pay for it if we possibly can” instead of increasing the federal debt load, the senator said.

Other countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should bear responsibility for delivering half the additional troops needed to secure the conflict zone and train Afghan forces, Levin said. He didn’t predict how many troops President Barack Obama would add.

Levin also said Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, who has faced calls for his resignation from Republicans in Congress, should stay as long as he has Obama’s confidence. The six-term senator said the administration was right to move the prosecution of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the self-proclaimed mastermind of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, to federal court in New York from a military commission in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Troop Decision Near

On Afghanistan, Obama may decide within a few weeks whether to grant a request from the top commander in the field, General Stanley McChrystal, for 40,000 more troops to fight the Taliban, which harbored al-Qaeda before being toppled in the invasion following the Sept. 11 attacks. The U.S. contributes about 70,000 of the 110,000 foreign forces fighting the Afghan war.

Levin, who has supported adding U.S. troops to the war mainly to train the Afghan army and police to take over, said he might back an increase closer to 40,000 under certain conditions. They include the proportion that would be used for training, a plan for preparing enough Afghan troops and a “major program” to provide equipment to their forces.

“There’s a lot of other things involved in showing resolve beside just a troop level,” Levin said. A key element to gain support will be “that whatever is announced, it be part of a NATO-Afghan initiative,” he said.

Conditions on Aid

The U.S. also should place conditions on aid that goes through Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s government to ensure that he cooperates in fighting corruption, Levin said. Karzai won re-election by default when his main challenger dropped out of a planned runoff after the first balloting in August was marred by allegations of fraud.

Levin said that while he wanted to be “hopeful” that Karzai would take steps to weed out corruption, “I’m also skeptical.”

Levin commended Pakistan’s leaders for turning more of their attention from their conflict with India to the Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters sheltering near the other border with Afghanistan. Pakistan’s army and its citizens have “taken some very severe losses” in fighting the militants, he said.

“They’ve got a way to go,” Levin said.

He also praised India, saying leaders had shown “restraint” in dealing with “fanatics” who crossed over the border from Pakistan.

On the economy, Levin said Geithner has been “very helpful” on finding ways to support automakers to preserve the industry.

Tighter Regulations

The broader financial crisis has demonstrated the need for tightening regulations on Wall Street, Levin said. He called the Obama administration’s recommendations “very significant.”

“I think the failure to move forward on those reforms in the Senate is the Republican resistance to some of those proposed reforms from the administration, not Democratic resistance,” Levin said.

He also praised proposals for changes from Connecticut Democrat Christopher Dodd, chairman of the Senate Banking Committee.

Dodd “has put forth a very significant reform of Wall Street,” Levin said. “It is long overdue.”

To contact the reporter on this story: Viola Gienger in Washington at vgienger@bloomberg.net

Last Updated: November 20, 2009 15:28 EST

Thursday, November 12, 2009

The American Economy in One Easy Chart

The chart below shows that interest rates have been decreasing by approximately 0.5% every 2 years. Put simply; As the price of debt becomes cheaper, more is created and then spent, and that effectively is the economy.





In 1981 the 30 year bond which is a good approximation for mortgage rates, was yielding 14% today it yields 4%. Mortgages will be slightly higher as it is perceived that it is safer to lend to a bankrupt Government than the public.





The interest rate has dropped over the last 30 years because the Fed has constantly dropped the short term Fed funds rate and we are now at 0%. The longer dated bonds will follow, as the 30 year Bond chart above very clearly shows,!! it is simply maintaining the yield curve.



Considering that virtually all lending by the banks is SECURED in some way on property. As secured lending accounts for well over 90% of all consumer lending. By constantly dropping interest rates, in line with the trendline above or 0.5% every 2 years, you will GUARANTEE A CONTINUOUS HOUSING BOOM.



Which is exactly what we have had for the last 30 years.



That is until the market runs ahead of itself and then crashes WHICH HAS NOW HAPPENED, or until you reach the ZERO BOUND position of 0% interest rates WHICH HAS NOW ALSO HAPPENED.



The economy is 70% based on the consumer, and the consumer has been trained over the last 30 years, just like Pavlov dogs to expect ever decreasing interest rates and attendant increasing property prices. However the Fed have a problem: They have no more food for the dogs, as they are now at 0%.



When you look at the chart above, have the Fed actually been setting interest rates? Or have they simply been adjusting them, to maintain the downward sloping trend line of the 30 year bond?



In the good old days as soon as the consumer creaked the rallying call went out DROP INTEREST RATES. The theory being if he/she can afford 50,000 of debt at 10% then he/she can afford 100,000 of debt at 5% !!! the 50,000 of new debt money will be spent in the economy and can be booked as “Growth”.



The Consumer is tapped out, so now the Government has taken over the perpetual debt machine, as they are the only big debt spender left in town.



The so called economy is nothing more than a consumption Ponzi Scheme. That has needed continuous feeding with a diet of ever decreasing interest rates and ever increasing consumer debt to survive. When you take on a loan they only lend you the PRINICIPAL they do not loan you the INTEREST, so either more debt is created by continually dropping interest rates, to cover this interest. Or you make the population bigger, more people entering the perpetual debt machine and taking on debt, hence all the immigration over the last 10 years. Whatever happens the total debt outstanding made up of Government, Consumer and Corporate debt. Must I repeat MUST get bigger or the system implodes. PONZI SCHEME!



Now we are at the 0%, and this gigantic Ponzi scheme of an economy has been exposed for what it really is nothing more than an elaborate financial PONZI SCHEME, there is no plan B. Apart from the Government spending lots of freshly printed Dollars therefore devaluing the purchasing power of all existing Dollars, Ultimately, it will be death by inflation.







By Ceri Shepherd

As seen on The Market Oracle



www.trendinvestor.info



http://trendinvestor.blogspot.com/







© 2009 Copyright Ceri Shepherd - All Rights Reserved Disclaimer: The above is a matter of opinion provided for general information purposes only and is not intended as investment advice. Information and analysis above are derived from sources and utilising methods believed to be reliable, but we cannot accept responsibility for any losses you may incur as a result of this analysis. Individuals should consult with their personal financial advisors.

Saturday, October 31, 2009

5-Year Option ARM Home Loans to Reset in 2010

by Andrew Freiburghouse



The home loan that has become the poster child for mortgage finance excess and error, the so-called "Option ARM," is starting to wedge its way back into the home refinance news cycle. Fiv

 e-year Option Adjustable Rate Mortgages taken out in 2005, that is, are due to reset in 2010.







An Option ARM loan customarily begins with a low teaser rate for a fixed period of time, in this case five years, but the borrower has an "option" to either pay the full payment or a lower payment. The difference between the full payment and the lower payment, if the full is not paid, is added onto the mortgage balance.



"Negative amortization," it's called.



How Many 5-Year Option ARMs Will Re-Set in 2010?



It's hard to get perfect statistics on how many Option ARMs are out there, because banks were not required to report this product specifically. According to BusinessWeek, approximately 1.3 billion borrowers took out approximately $389 billion in Option ARM home loans during 2004 and 2005.



According to Fitch Ratings, up to 80 percent of Option ARM borrowers only pay the minimum payment. Added, then, to the overall decline of the housing market, is the negative amortization problem.



The batch of 5-year Option ARMs taken out in 2005 includes hundreds of thousands of severely underwater homeowners.



The Time to Refinance that Option ARM Is Now or Soon





Mortgage refinance rates remain low and, although refinancing is still not easy, credit appears to have eased at least somewhat. If there ever was a time to refinance that Option ARM, that time is now or soon.



Now or soon because the housing market appears to be stabilizing, with house prices rising over the past few months. Rising house prices, combined with government insistence that banks at least try to refi struggling borrowers, must be counted as the best hope for those wishing to refinance out of Option ARM mortgages. Conventional refinance deals are not usually possible due to loan-to-value concerns.



Refinance at Any Cost? Not Necessarily



Definitely, borrowers with Option ARMs due to reset in 2010 must be actively looking at refinance options. However, that does not necessarily mean such borrowers should refinance at any price.



No doubt, dealing with a troubled home loan can be a frightening experience, but borrowers must still strive to be rational about what's best to do in this situation. Certainly it's not worth refinancing out of one unaffordable loan into another unaffordable loan, for example.



Finding an honest, competent mortgage pro to help with these complexities is a wise choice in these trying refinance times.















About Author:







Andrew Freiburghouse is a writer and businessman. He has worked as a magazine reporter, tax preparer, screenwriter, copywriter, and loan officer. He graduated from Santa Clara University in 1999 with a B.A. in English. Andrew was born and raised in the City of Los Angeles.







Buzz up!ShareThis

Friday, October 30, 2009

Obama lifts ban on HIV / AIDS emmigrants and entry to US

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - President Barack Obama announced on Friday that a 22-year-old ban on allowing people infected with the AIDS virus into the United States will be lifted on Monday.

Obama made the announcement in signing an extension of the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Treatment Act, which provides for education, prevention and treatment programs for U.S. HIV patients

. immigrants

Obama said the ban was imposed 22 years ago when visitors to the United States were treated as a threat.

"We lead the world when it comes to helping stem the AIDS pandemic -- yet we are one of only a dozen countries that still bar people from HIV from entering our own country," he said.

"If we want to be the global leader in combating HIV/AIDS, we need to act like it," he said.

He said on Monday his administration will publish a final rule that eliminates the travel ban effective just after the first of 2010.

The AIDS virus infects 33 million people globally and around a million in the United States.

(Reporting by Steve Holland, editing by Jackie Frank)

Thursday, October 29, 2009

Chart of Derivative time bomb held by banks



Read article by Graham Summers - at The Market Oracle

Why the Goldman Sachs-AIG Story Won’t Go Away: Bloomberg

I'm glad to see that there are concerned individuals that will keep digging into the relationship that Goldman Sachs has to the US government, especially the Treasury. This is a nice follow up piece to several posts on this subject that I've made here over the last year. My thanks to Jonathan Weil and to Bloomberg.com. / GB





Commentary by Jonathan Weil





Oct. 29 (Bloomberg) -- How did so much taxpayer money end up in the coffers of American International Group Inc.’s too- big-to-fail customers? The more we find out, the more it becomes obvious we still don’t know the half of it.



It’s the story that won’t go away: Was last year’s federal rescue of AIG a back-door bailout for the likes of Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Societe Generale SA, Deutsche Bank AG, Merrill Lynch & Co. and other large banks? And who exactly were the regulators trying to protect when they seized control of the insurance giant in September 2008? The banks? Or the rest of us?



To believe AIG’s disclosures, you’d have thought its executives decided on their own last year to pay 100 cents on the dollar to the various banks that had bought $62 billion of credit-default swaps from the company. Now, thanks to an Oct. 27 story by Bloomberg News reporters Richard Teitelbaum and Hugh Son, we know otherwise.



It turns out the decision to make the banks whole wasn’t AIG’s. It was made by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, back when its president was the current U.S. Treasury secretary, Timothy Geithner, and its chairman was Goldman Sachs director Stephen Friedman. (Friedman resigned from the New York Fed in May, after the Wall Street Journal reported he had bought more than 50,000 shares of Goldman stock following AIG’s takeover.)



Before AIG was seized, its executives had been negotiating for months with the banks, trying to get them to accept discounts of as much as 40 cents on the dollar, Bloomberg reported, citing people familiar with the matter.



Taking Over



Then, late in the week of Nov. 3, the New York Fed took over the negotiations with the banks from AIG, together with the Treasury Department (at the time run by former Goldman boss Henry Paulson) and Chairman Ben Bernanke’s Federal Reserve Board. Less than a week later, the New York Fed instructed AIG to pay the counterparties in full, Bloomberg reported.



Judging by the result, you might think Geithner’s team was on the banks’ side, rather than AIG’s.



AIG wound up paying $32.5 billion to retire the swaps, $13 billion more than if it had paid, say, 60 cents on the dollar. The New York Fed also arranged to pay the banks $29.6 billion for collateralized-debt obligations backed by subprime mortgages and other loans, a tad less than half their face value. (The swaps were side bets by the banks that rose in value as the CDOs fell.)



It probably made sense for the counterparties to reject AIG’s initial settlement offers. They had their own investors to look after. And once the government took control of AIG, it couldn’t credibly threaten to force the company into bankruptcy proceedings. The premise of the government’s seizure, after all, was that AIG was too big to fail.



Rush to Pay



But why the rush to pay the banks in full once Geithner’s team took over the talks? The public has never gotten satisfactory answers, notwithstanding that the government’s commitment to AIG now stands at about $182 billion.



In a story published yesterday in response to Bloomberg’s scoop, the New York Fed’s general counsel, Thomas Baxter, told the Washington Post that officials were racing to prevent AIG’s collapse and didn’t have time for protracted negotiations with each creditor. That won’t put to rest suspicions that regulators used AIG as a slush fund to shield some of the banks from losses, using taxpayer money.



Nor has anyone from AIG or the government explained why there was such a hurry to buy the CDOs. While the banks supposedly received market prices, that deal has since turned sour for taxpayers. The value of the securities, now held by a Fed-run entity called Maiden Lane III, was down by about $7 billion as of June 30, according to the New York Fed.



The public might get some answers soon. Next month, the inspector general for the government’s Troubled Asset Relief Program, Neil Barofsky, is scheduled to release a report on whether AIG overpaid the banks, and the extent to which the counterparties’ own financial problems may have been at issue.



Goldman Sachs Untouched



Goldman, for one, has long said it wouldn’t have incurred any material losses even if AIG had gone under.



“We limited our overall credit exposure to AIG through a combination of collateral and market hedges,” Goldman’s chief financial officer, David Viniar, said in March. “There would have been no credit losses if AIG had failed.”



Then again, Viniar is the same guy who this month made the ridiculous claim that Goldman doesn’t have a too-big-to-fail guarantee from the government. Goldman has refused to identify who the counterparties were on the other side of its hedges, rendering Viniar’s statement in March unverifiable.



Even if Goldman was fully hedged, it’s reasonable to assume that not all the other banks were. We shouldn’t have to guess anymore, though. It’s long past time for the government to start telling us the whole truth about what happened at AIG.



We’ve had too many secrets in this financial crisis already.





(Jonathan Weil is a Bloomberg News columnist. The opinions expressed are his own.)



Click on “Send Comment” in the sidebar display to send a letter to the editor.



To contact the writer of this column: Jonathan Weil in New York at jweil6@bloomberg.net



Last Updated: October 28, 2009 21:00 EDT

Sunday, October 25, 2009

Be afraid! A year after AIG, derivatives remain big risk



Satyajit Das* ' London Evening Standard



12.10.09



The global financial crisis has introduced ordinary people to the extraordinary and arcane world of “derivative product” — a gigantic system of commercial bets in financial markets where the total outstanding amount of derivatives adds up to a mere $600 trillion (some 10 times the value of global production).





The City is one of the leading centres of this trading activity.





A year ago, AIG was brought to the brink of bankruptcy because of its exposure to one type of derivative — credit default swaps (a form of credit insurance). Asset-backed securities and collateralised debt obligations — also cheerily known as Chernobyl death obligations — helped to bring the financial system to the edge of collapse.



Volatile equity and currency markets caused problems with exotic option “accumulators” and now numerous investors and corporations are hunkered down with their lawyers hoping to litigate their way out of significant losses on “hedges” pleading such familiar defences as “I did not understand the risks” or “I was misled about the risks by the bank”.





If you thought this would lead regulators such as the Financial Services Authority, the Bank of England and America's Federal Reserve to tame the wild beast of derivatives, then you would be wrong. History tells us that there will be cosmetic changes to the functioning of the market but business as usual will resume in the not too distant future.



Previous episodes of derivative problems — portfolio insurance in 1987 and long-term capital management in 1998 — never led to changes in fundamental issues such as using derivatives for speculation, mis-selling instruments to less-sophisticated market participants and excessive complexity.



The industry and its key lobby group, the International Swaps & Derivatives Association, are well-practised in the art of playing the regulatory game.



Derivatives, it will be argued, are so complicated that only derivative traders themselves can properly “regulate” them. The new centralised counterparty to reduce the risk of a major dealer failing is only for “standardised” derivatives and already there are impassioned debates about what is meant by “standard derivatives”.



On 17 September, the chief executive of the derivatives association, Robert Pickel, told the House Agriculture Committee in America: “Not all standardised contracts can be cleared,” because even if they have standardised economic terms, many derivatives contracts will be “difficult if not impossible to clear” since the counterparty depends on liquidity, trading volume and daily pricing. This would, Pickel said, make “it difficult for a clearing house to calculate collateral requirements consistent with prudent risk management.”





Dan Budofsky, a partner at legal firm Davis Polk & Wardwell, who testified on behalf of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, agreed that “it may be more appropriate for products that trade less frequently to trade over-the-counter”. The industry will argue for self-regulation, which is about as close to regulation as self-importance is to importance.



The reasons for policy inaction are complex. Derivatives do perform important risk-transfer functions within modern capital markets — their Dr Jekyll side — and Pickel eloquently made the point that standardisation and the centralised counterparty “would undercut [derivatives'] very purpose: the ability to customise risk-management solutions to meet the needs of end-users”.



But derivatives also have a Mr Hyde side: they are used to speculate, keep dealings off-balance sheet and out of sight, increase leverage, arbitrage regulatory and tax rules and manufacture exotic risk cocktails.



What industry participants will not acknowledge is that the Dr Jekyll side of derivative trading has taken second place to the Mr Hyde side.



For companies, the ability to use derivative trading to supplement traditional earnings, which are under increased pressure, is irresistible.





The complexity of modern derivatives has little to do with risk transfer and everything to do with profits.



As new products are immediately copied by competitors, traders must “innovate” to maintain revenue by increasing volumes or creating new structures.



Complexity delays competition, prevents clients from unbundling products and generally reduces transparency. Frequently, the models used to price, hedge and determine the profitability also manage to confuse managers and controllers within banks themselves allowing traders to book large fictitious “profits” that their bonuses are based on.



The scary part is that regulators on both sides of the Atlantic seem unable to marshal the knowledge, skill, gumption, political will and backbone to be able to implement the changes that are called for.



Warren Buffet once described bankers in the following terms: “Wall Street never voluntarily abandons a highly profitable field. Years ago … a fellow on Wall Street was talking about the evils of drugs.



“He ranted on for between 15 and 20 minutes to a small crowd and then asked, Do you have any questions?' An investment banker instantly shot his hand up and said: Could you tell me who makes the needles?'”



Derivatives and debt are the needles of finance and bankers will continue to supply them to all the Dr Jekylls and Mr Hydes alike for the foreseeable future as long as there is money to be made in the trade.



Taxpayers should just start saving for the future losses that they will have cover to bail out the banks at a time to be arranged in the future.



* Satyajit Das is a risk consultant and the author of Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives (2006, FT-Prentice Hall)