Fears that Dubai may not be able to meet the payments on its massive foreign debt sparked a sell-off on stockmarkets around the world as investors worried about the health of the once-booming emirate and scoured their portfolios for exposure.
Most of the concern is focused on Dubai World, one of the Persian Gulf emirate’s flagship conglomerates, with total debt of about US$59-billion, about twice the size of the gross domestic product. On Wednesday the Dubai government asked for permission to postpone payment on part of the debt, sending lenders scurrying to try to get a better understanding of the situation.
The nightmare scenario is that a default by Dubai World could set off a “cascading effect” as banks across the world buckle from losses, in the same way that the failure of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. last year nearly collapsed the global financial system, said Brian Eby, a portfolio manager at Connor, Clark & Lunn in Vancouver.
“I think that is unlikely but there is still not enough known [to be sure],” he said.
The S&P/TSX Composite Index Thursday fell 200 points, or 1.7%, to 11,436.8, the biggest drop in almost a month.
In London, the FTSE 100 declined 171 points, or 3.18%, while Germany’s DAX slumped 189 points, or 3.25%.
Analysts said it is unlikely Canadian lenders have significant exposure to Dubai despite the drop on the TSX.
“The market is still trying to figure it out and there is a lot of uncertainty, but really I think the issue is European and U.K. banks,” Mr Eby said .
Shares in all the Canadian banks declined with Bank of Nova Scotia falling the most with a drop of $1.15 or 2.3% to $47.91.
Manulife Financial Corp. and Fairfax Financial each went so far as to put out a press release stating they have no exposure to Dubai World.
Banks outside of Canada that are creditors to Dubai World include HSBC Holdings, Barclays, Lloyds Banking Group, Royal Bank of Scotland, and Credit Suisse.
Over the last decade Dubai World has been engaged in an ambitious effort to transform the city of Dubai into a global capital, partly through its Nakeel Group subsidiary, whose credits include world’s tallest building and an artificial island of luxury homes in the shape of a palm tree.
While the economy was booming, banks and pension funds in other parts of the world were happy to bankroll the expansion binge.
But the taps were turned off when the financial crisis hit, sending ripples through the global financial system as lenders worried the strength of the company and its owners.
Before the financial crisis, Dubai benefitted from soaring oil prices even despite having little oil wealth of its own as neighbouring states bought into the idea of a Persian Gulf financial centre and invested in its real estate. But with oil trading well below its peak, countries like Saudi Arabia have less wealth to spend and limited incentive to help out Dubai.
If the emirate is unable to reach an agreement with its creditors, it may be forced into a restructuring.
Because Dubai is a monarchy, the ultimate owners of Dubai World are the ruling royal family.
When concerns about the viability of the company first emerged in the aftermath of the crisis the government was able to persuade banks that the debt would be repaid, but analysts said this time around the outcome is less clear.
A top Dubai financial official said in a statement on Thursday that he understands the concerns of creditors but that “decisive action” must be taken to deal with Dubai World debt burden.
Analysts said a key concern it that if Dubai is unable to meet its obligations, it set off a chain reaction of defaults across the region.
Thursday, November 26, 2009
Will Dubai defaults set off chain reaction?
Dubai defaults
Dubai World Seeks to Delay Debt Payments as Default Risk Soars – Bloomberg.com
” Dubai World, with $59 billion of liabilities, is seeking to delay debt payments…Dubai accumulated $80 billion of debt by expanding in banking, real estate and transportation before credit markets seized up last year…Dubai’s Supreme Fiscal Committee hired Deloitte LLP to lead the restructuring of Dubai World debt”
This is the state owned entity…it appears that there is a high probability that the country will default.
“Sheikh Mohammed turned to Abu Dhabi, the capital of the U.A.E. and holder of the world’s sixth-largest crude oil reserves, in February for a $10 billion bailout. The central bank, headquartered in Abu Dhabi, bought all of the 4 percent, five-year securities that Dubai sold on Feb. 23″…so Dubai is at the mercy of it’s neighboring countries.
Update: Reuters
Looks like default is a done deal:
"“Dubai World intends to ask all providers of financing to Dubai World and Nakheel to ’standstill’ and extend maturities until at least 30 May 2010,” the government said in a statement…”Abu Dhabi has been supportive of Dubai, but it appears this support is not enough for Dubai to meet its obligations on time.”"
Found at Wasatch Economics
” Dubai World, with $59 billion of liabilities, is seeking to delay debt payments…Dubai accumulated $80 billion of debt by expanding in banking, real estate and transportation before credit markets seized up last year…Dubai’s Supreme Fiscal Committee hired Deloitte LLP to lead the restructuring of Dubai World debt”
This is the state owned entity…it appears that there is a high probability that the country will default.
“Sheikh Mohammed turned to Abu Dhabi, the capital of the U.A.E. and holder of the world’s sixth-largest crude oil reserves, in February for a $10 billion bailout. The central bank, headquartered in Abu Dhabi, bought all of the 4 percent, five-year securities that Dubai sold on Feb. 23″…so Dubai is at the mercy of it’s neighboring countries.
Update: Reuters
Looks like default is a done deal:
"“Dubai World intends to ask all providers of financing to Dubai World and Nakheel to ’standstill’ and extend maturities until at least 30 May 2010,” the government said in a statement…”Abu Dhabi has been supportive of Dubai, but it appears this support is not enough for Dubai to meet its obligations on time.”"
Found at Wasatch Economics
Dubai expected to default on $80 billion in loans!
Dubai is shaking investor confidence across the Persian Gulf after it sought a six-month reprieve on debt payments that risked triggering the biggest sovereign default since Argentina in 200121:20 GMT. Global stock markets endured heavy selling on Thursday as investors were spooked by the spectre of a default by Dubai and after a febrile foreign exchange market saw the yen surge to a 14-year high against the dollar.
The move caused a drop on world markets on Thursday and raised questions about Dubai's reputation as a magnet for international investment.
In Europe, the FTSE 100, Germany's DAX and the CAC-40 in France opened sharply lower. Earlier in Asia, the Shanghai index sank 119 points, or 3.6%, in the biggest one-day fall since August 31. Hong Kong's Hang Seng shed 1.8%. Wall Street was closed for the Thanksgiving holiday and most markets in the Middle East were silent because of a major Islamic feast.
Stocks, bonds and currencies fell across developing countries. The MSCI Emerging Markets Index of stocks dropped 1.1%, led by declines in China and Russia.
The fallout came swiftly after Wednesday's statement that Dubai's main development engine, Dubai World, would ask creditors for a standstill on paying back its $60 billion debt until at least May. The company's real estate arm, Nakheel -- whose projects include the palm-shaped island in the Gulf -- shoulders the bulk of money due to banks, investment houses and outside development contractors.
In total, the state-backed networks nicknamed Dubai Inc are $80 billion in the red and the emirate needed a bailout earlier this year from its oil-rich neighbour Abu Dhabi, the capital of the United Arab Emirates.
``Nakheel is now standing on the brink of failure given the astonishing amount of cash Dubai would have to inject into it in order to see the enterprise survive,'' said Luis Costa, emerging-market debt strategist at Commerzbank AG in London. ``Events like this are a perfect storm.''
``Dubai's standstill announcement ... was vague and it remains difficult to discern whether the call for a standstill will be voluntary,'' said a statement from the Eurasia Group, a Washington-based research group that assesses political and financial risk for foreign investors interested in Dubai. ``If it is not, Dubai World will be going into default and that will have more serious negative repercussions for Dubai's sovereign debt, Dubai World and market confidence in the UAE in general,'' the statement added.
``There is nothing investors dislike more than this kind of event,'' said Norval Loftus, the head of convertible bonds and Islamic debt at Matrix Group Ltd. in London, which manages $2.5 billion of assets including Dubai credits. ``The worst-case scenario will of course be involuntary restructuring on the Nakheel security that brings into question the entire nature of the sovereign support for various borrowers in the region.''
Moodys Investors Service and Standard & Poor's cut the ratings on state companies yesterday, saying they may consider state-controlled Dubai World's plan to delay debt payments a default. The sheikhdom, ruled by Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, borrowed $80 billion in a four-year construction boom that reduced its reliance on falling oil supplies and created the region's tourism and financial hub.
``Dubai is the most indicative of the huge global liquidity boom and now in the aftermath there will be further defaults to come in emerging markets and globally,'' said Nick Chamie, head of emerging-market research at Toronto-based RBC Capital Markets.
``It's very important to resolve this in a way that will minimize contagion across the region,'' Matrix Groups Loftus said. The moot question is whether that will be possible.
The turmoil caused a flight to less risky assets. Gold, which had challenged $1,200 in Asian trading, fell back from its highs and money flowed into havens such as German government bonds.
US markets were closed for the Thanksgiving holiday, but electronic trading of the benchmark S&P 500 equity futures contract had shown a potential drop on Wall Street of 2.2 per cent.
In Europe, the FTSE 100 lost 3.2 per cent at 5,194.1, its worst day since March, while the FTSE Eurofirst 300 fell 3.3 per cent to 988.1.
Initial weakness was blamed on a sell-off in Asia that appeared to be prompted by the yen’s sudden rise. But as the European trading day progressed, it became clear it was Dubai World’s difficulties that had hit a particular nerve, reminding investors of the lingering damage wrought by the financial crisis
Banking stocks tumbled on concern about their potential exposure to Dubai. Indeed, the cost of insuring against default by the emirate jumped, with Reuters reporting the Dubai five-year credit default swap being quoted as high as 500-550 basis points. This means it would cost about $500,000 a year to insure $10m of Dubai’s debt. On Tuesday it would have cost about $360,000.
Greek and Irish government five-year credit default swaps also moved higher as nations with supposedly precarious fiscal positions were punished. In contrast, investors sought out comparative haven assets, pushing the yield on the German Bund down by 8 basis points to 3.16 per cent.
Earlier in the trading day the focus had been on a volatile period in the foreign exchange markets.
The Nikkei 225 fell to a fresh four-month low, off 0.6 per cent to 9,383.2, as exporters wilted in response to a sudden bounce by the yen. The Japanese unit – considered by many to be the haven currency of choice – suddenly burst through Y87 to the dollar at 03:20 GMT.
After breaching this level, the buying accelerated, taking the yen to Y86.30, a fresh 14-year high versus the greenback. It also made headway against the euro.
Comments from Hirohisa Fujii, Japan’s finance minister, that he was watching forex market moves very closely and that the country could take appropriate steps if moves were ”abnormal”, initially helped pare some of the yen’s gains.
But as the European session advanced, investors started to move with ever greater force into the so-called haven currencies, boosting the yen and dollar, most notably at the expense of the euro.
Later the yen was up 1.8 per cent against the euro at $129.79, and had gained 1 per cent against the otherwise stronger dollar at Y86.45.
The dollar, after dipping in Asia to a fresh 15-month low on a trade-weighted basis, later revelled in traders’ reduced risk appetite, bouncing 0.8 per cent versus the euro to $1.5013. Against a basket of currencies it recovered from 74.17 to later trade 0.7 per cent higher but was still just under the crucial 75.0 mark.
Gold took advantage of the early frantic forex action to hit another high of $1,194.90 an ounce. But it was later down 0.3 per cent at $1,188.38 as the dollar found its footing.
Equity investors across Asia had appeared concerned about the implications of such a sharp rise in haven currencies.
Mainland China’s benchmark, the Shanghai Composite, slid 3.6 per cent to 3,170.9, also on continuing worries regarding the banking sector, while Hong Kong’s Hang Seng fell 1.8 per cent to 22,216.3 as a share debut by China Minsheng Bank disappointed. In Australia, the S&P/ASX 200 lost 0.3 per cent to 4,708.6.
By late afternoon in New York, Asian futures were down, pointing to another difficult day for global markets.
Oil dipped 2.2 per cent to $76.23 in electronic trading, though pits and Wall Street were closed on Thursday for the Thanksgiving holiday.
Overnight, US equities had managed to just finish at a new high for the year.
The move caused a drop on world markets on Thursday and raised questions about Dubai's reputation as a magnet for international investment.
In Europe, the FTSE 100, Germany's DAX and the CAC-40 in France opened sharply lower. Earlier in Asia, the Shanghai index sank 119 points, or 3.6%, in the biggest one-day fall since August 31. Hong Kong's Hang Seng shed 1.8%. Wall Street was closed for the Thanksgiving holiday and most markets in the Middle East were silent because of a major Islamic feast.
Stocks, bonds and currencies fell across developing countries. The MSCI Emerging Markets Index of stocks dropped 1.1%, led by declines in China and Russia.
The fallout came swiftly after Wednesday's statement that Dubai's main development engine, Dubai World, would ask creditors for a standstill on paying back its $60 billion debt until at least May. The company's real estate arm, Nakheel -- whose projects include the palm-shaped island in the Gulf -- shoulders the bulk of money due to banks, investment houses and outside development contractors.
In total, the state-backed networks nicknamed Dubai Inc are $80 billion in the red and the emirate needed a bailout earlier this year from its oil-rich neighbour Abu Dhabi, the capital of the United Arab Emirates.
``Nakheel is now standing on the brink of failure given the astonishing amount of cash Dubai would have to inject into it in order to see the enterprise survive,'' said Luis Costa, emerging-market debt strategist at Commerzbank AG in London. ``Events like this are a perfect storm.''
``Dubai's standstill announcement ... was vague and it remains difficult to discern whether the call for a standstill will be voluntary,'' said a statement from the Eurasia Group, a Washington-based research group that assesses political and financial risk for foreign investors interested in Dubai. ``If it is not, Dubai World will be going into default and that will have more serious negative repercussions for Dubai's sovereign debt, Dubai World and market confidence in the UAE in general,'' the statement added.
``There is nothing investors dislike more than this kind of event,'' said Norval Loftus, the head of convertible bonds and Islamic debt at Matrix Group Ltd. in London, which manages $2.5 billion of assets including Dubai credits. ``The worst-case scenario will of course be involuntary restructuring on the Nakheel security that brings into question the entire nature of the sovereign support for various borrowers in the region.''
Moodys Investors Service and Standard & Poor's cut the ratings on state companies yesterday, saying they may consider state-controlled Dubai World's plan to delay debt payments a default. The sheikhdom, ruled by Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, borrowed $80 billion in a four-year construction boom that reduced its reliance on falling oil supplies and created the region's tourism and financial hub.
``Dubai is the most indicative of the huge global liquidity boom and now in the aftermath there will be further defaults to come in emerging markets and globally,'' said Nick Chamie, head of emerging-market research at Toronto-based RBC Capital Markets.
``It's very important to resolve this in a way that will minimize contagion across the region,'' Matrix Groups Loftus said. The moot question is whether that will be possible.
The turmoil caused a flight to less risky assets. Gold, which had challenged $1,200 in Asian trading, fell back from its highs and money flowed into havens such as German government bonds.
US markets were closed for the Thanksgiving holiday, but electronic trading of the benchmark S&P 500 equity futures contract had shown a potential drop on Wall Street of 2.2 per cent.
In Europe, the FTSE 100 lost 3.2 per cent at 5,194.1, its worst day since March, while the FTSE Eurofirst 300 fell 3.3 per cent to 988.1.
Initial weakness was blamed on a sell-off in Asia that appeared to be prompted by the yen’s sudden rise. But as the European trading day progressed, it became clear it was Dubai World’s difficulties that had hit a particular nerve, reminding investors of the lingering damage wrought by the financial crisis
Banking stocks tumbled on concern about their potential exposure to Dubai. Indeed, the cost of insuring against default by the emirate jumped, with Reuters reporting the Dubai five-year credit default swap being quoted as high as 500-550 basis points. This means it would cost about $500,000 a year to insure $10m of Dubai’s debt. On Tuesday it would have cost about $360,000.
Greek and Irish government five-year credit default swaps also moved higher as nations with supposedly precarious fiscal positions were punished. In contrast, investors sought out comparative haven assets, pushing the yield on the German Bund down by 8 basis points to 3.16 per cent.
Earlier in the trading day the focus had been on a volatile period in the foreign exchange markets.
The Nikkei 225 fell to a fresh four-month low, off 0.6 per cent to 9,383.2, as exporters wilted in response to a sudden bounce by the yen. The Japanese unit – considered by many to be the haven currency of choice – suddenly burst through Y87 to the dollar at 03:20 GMT.
After breaching this level, the buying accelerated, taking the yen to Y86.30, a fresh 14-year high versus the greenback. It also made headway against the euro.
Comments from Hirohisa Fujii, Japan’s finance minister, that he was watching forex market moves very closely and that the country could take appropriate steps if moves were ”abnormal”, initially helped pare some of the yen’s gains.
But as the European session advanced, investors started to move with ever greater force into the so-called haven currencies, boosting the yen and dollar, most notably at the expense of the euro.
Later the yen was up 1.8 per cent against the euro at $129.79, and had gained 1 per cent against the otherwise stronger dollar at Y86.45.
The dollar, after dipping in Asia to a fresh 15-month low on a trade-weighted basis, later revelled in traders’ reduced risk appetite, bouncing 0.8 per cent versus the euro to $1.5013. Against a basket of currencies it recovered from 74.17 to later trade 0.7 per cent higher but was still just under the crucial 75.0 mark.
Gold took advantage of the early frantic forex action to hit another high of $1,194.90 an ounce. But it was later down 0.3 per cent at $1,188.38 as the dollar found its footing.
Equity investors across Asia had appeared concerned about the implications of such a sharp rise in haven currencies.
Mainland China’s benchmark, the Shanghai Composite, slid 3.6 per cent to 3,170.9, also on continuing worries regarding the banking sector, while Hong Kong’s Hang Seng fell 1.8 per cent to 22,216.3 as a share debut by China Minsheng Bank disappointed. In Australia, the S&P/ASX 200 lost 0.3 per cent to 4,708.6.
By late afternoon in New York, Asian futures were down, pointing to another difficult day for global markets.
Oil dipped 2.2 per cent to $76.23 in electronic trading, though pits and Wall Street were closed on Thursday for the Thanksgiving holiday.
Overnight, US equities had managed to just finish at a new high for the year.
Tuesday, November 24, 2009
Three Decades of Subsidized Risk
By CHARLES GASPARINO / WSJ
I recently sat down with legendary investor Ted Forstmann to discuss why, on the one-year
By CHARLES GASPARINO
I recently sat down with legendary investor Ted Forstmann to discuss why, on the one-year anniversary of the financial meltdown, the press has largely ignored the role of government in creating the meltdown—and possibly setting the stage for another one—by allowing Wall Street to borrow cheaply and easily during the past three decades.
"I guess reporters think writing about greedy investment bankers is more interesting," Mr. Forstmann laughed.
Mr. Forstmann knows a thing or two about greedy investment bankers: He's been calling them on the carpet for years, most famously during the 1980s when he fulminated against the excesses of the junk-bond era. He also knows that blaming banking greed alone can't by itself explain the financial tsunami that tore the markets apart last year and left the banking system and the economy in tatters.
The greed merchants needed a co-conspirator, Mr. Forstmann argues, and that co-conspirator is and was the United States government.
"They're always there waiting to hand out free money," he said. "They just throw money at the problem every time Wall Street gets in trouble. It starts out when they have a cold and it builds until the risk-taking leads to cancer."
Mr. Forstmann's point shouldn't be taken lightly. Not by the press, nor by policy makers in Washington. But so far it has been, and the easy money is flowing like never before. Interest rates are close to zero; in effect the Federal Reserve is subsidizing the risk-taking and bond trading that has allowed Goldman Sachs to produce billions in profits and that infamous $16 billion bonus pool (analysts say it could grow to as high as $20 billion). The Treasury has lent banks money, guaranteed Wall Street's debt and declared every firm to be a commercial bank, from Citigroup with close to $1 trillion in U.S. deposits, to Morgan Stanley with close to zero. They are all "too big to fail" and so free to trade as they please—on the taxpayer dime.
The conventional wisdom as perpetuated in the media is that these bailout mechanisms are unique, designed to ameliorate a once-in-a-lifetime financial "perfect storm." They are unique, but only in size. A quick look back at the past three decades will demonstrate what Mr. Forstmann meant when he said the government has been ready to hand out free money nearly every time risk-taking led to losses.
The first mortgage market meltdown of the mid-1980s, spurred by the Fed's supply of easy money, was among the most painful market upheavals in the history of the bond market. The pioneers of the mortgage bond market, Lew Ranieri of Salomon Brothers and Larry Fink of First Boston (the same Larry Fink now considered a sage CEO at money management powerhouse BlackRock), lost what were then unheard-of sums of money. (Mr. Fink concedes to losses of over $100 million.)
"What happened then was a dry run of what was to come," Mr. Fink recently told me, as he looked back on the market he created, which would eventually lie at the heart of the most recent financial crisis. Wall Street took excessive risk in mortgage bonds amid the easy money supplied by the Fed—and lost. When the crisis began, the Fed under then Chairman Alan Greenspan slashed interest rates—as it would do after Orange County, Calif., declared bankruptcy in 1994 because of bad bets on complex bonds; and again in 1998 when the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) blew up; and of course in the bond-market crisis of 2007 and 2008. The lower rates each time lessened the pain of the risk-taking gone awry, and opened the door for increased risk down the line.
Easy money wasn't the only way government induced the bubble. The mortgage-bond market was the mechanism by which policy makers transformed home ownership into something that must be earned into something close to a civil right. The Community Reinvestment Act and projects by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, beginning in the Clinton years, couldn't have been accomplished without the mortgage bond—which allowed banks to offload the increasingly risky mortgages to Wall Street, which in turn securitized them into triple-A rated bonds thanks to compliant ratings agencies.
The perversity of these efforts wasn't merely that bonds packed with subprime loans received such high ratings. It was also that by inducing homeownership, the government was itself making homeownership less affordable. Because families without the real economic means to repay traditional 30-year mortgages were getting them, housing prices grew to artificially high levels.
This is where the real sin of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac comes into play. Both were created by Congress to make housing affordable to the middle class. But when they began guaranteeing subprime loans, they actually began pricing out the working class from the market until the banking business responded with ways to make repayment of mortgages allegedly easier through adjustable rates loans that start off with low payments. But these loans, fully sanctioned by the government, were a ticking time bomb, as we're all now so painfully aware.
A similar bomb exploded in 1998, when LTCM blew up. The policy response to the LTCM debacle is instructive; more than anything else it solidified Wall Street's belief that there were little if any real risks to risk-taking. With $5 billion under management, LTCM was deemed too big to fail because, with nearly every major firm copying its money losing trades, much of Wall Street might have failed with it.
That's what the policy makers told us anyway. On Wall Street there's general agreement that the implosion of LTCM would have tanked one of the biggest risk takers in the market, Lehman Brothers, a full decade before its historic bankruptcy filing. Officials at Merrill, including its then-CFO (and future CEO) Stan O'Neal, believed Merrill's risk-taking in esoteric bonds could have led to a similar implosion 10 years before its calamitous merger with Bank of America.
We'll never know if LTCM's demise would have tanked the financial system or simply tanked a couple of firms that bet wrong. But one thing is certain: A valuable lesson in risk-taking was lost. By 2007, the years of excessive risk-taking, aided and abetted by the belief that the government was ready to paper over mistakes, had taken their toll.
With so much easy money, with the government always ready to ease their pain, Wall Street developed new and even more innovative ways to make money through risk-taking. The old mortgage bonds created by Messrs. Fink and Ranieri as simple securitized pools had morphed into the so-called collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), complex structures that allowed Wall Street banks as well as quasi-governmental agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to securitize ever riskier mortgages.
Mr. O'Neal, the man considered most responsible for Merrill's disastrous foray into risk-taking, told me in an interview last year that in the fall of 2007, when he saw that the firm's problems were insurmountable, he had a deal to sell Merrill to Bank of America for around $90 a share. But Merrill's board rejected it, believing he would be selling out cheaply. The CDOs would eventually recover, they argued, as the Fed pumped life into the markets.
Likewise, nearly to the minute he was forced to file for bankruptcy, former Lehman CEO Dick Fuld believed the government wouldn't let Lehman die. After all, government largess had always been there in the past.
All of which brings me back to Mr. Fortsmann's comment about policy makers helping turn a cold into cancer. What if the Fed hadn't eased Wall Street's pain in the late 1980s, and again after the 1994 bond-market collapse? What if policy makers in 1998 had allowed the markets to feel the consequences of risk—allowing LTCM to fail, and letting Lehman Brothers and possibly Merrill Lynch die as well?
There would have been pain—lots of it—for Wall Street and even for Main Street, but a lot less than what we're experiencing today. Wall Street would have learned a valuable lesson: There are consequences to risk.
Mr. Gasparino is a CNBC on-air editor and the author, most recently, of "The Sellout: How Three Decades of Wall Street Greed and Government Mismanagement Destroyed the Global Financial System," just published by HarperBusiness.
I recently sat down with legendary investor Ted Forstmann to discuss why, on the one-year
By CHARLES GASPARINO
I recently sat down with legendary investor Ted Forstmann to discuss why, on the one-year anniversary of the financial meltdown, the press has largely ignored the role of government in creating the meltdown—and possibly setting the stage for another one—by allowing Wall Street to borrow cheaply and easily during the past three decades.
"I guess reporters think writing about greedy investment bankers is more interesting," Mr. Forstmann laughed.
Mr. Forstmann knows a thing or two about greedy investment bankers: He's been calling them on the carpet for years, most famously during the 1980s when he fulminated against the excesses of the junk-bond era. He also knows that blaming banking greed alone can't by itself explain the financial tsunami that tore the markets apart last year and left the banking system and the economy in tatters.
The greed merchants needed a co-conspirator, Mr. Forstmann argues, and that co-conspirator is and was the United States government.
"They're always there waiting to hand out free money," he said. "They just throw money at the problem every time Wall Street gets in trouble. It starts out when they have a cold and it builds until the risk-taking leads to cancer."
Mr. Forstmann's point shouldn't be taken lightly. Not by the press, nor by policy makers in Washington. But so far it has been, and the easy money is flowing like never before. Interest rates are close to zero; in effect the Federal Reserve is subsidizing the risk-taking and bond trading that has allowed Goldman Sachs to produce billions in profits and that infamous $16 billion bonus pool (analysts say it could grow to as high as $20 billion). The Treasury has lent banks money, guaranteed Wall Street's debt and declared every firm to be a commercial bank, from Citigroup with close to $1 trillion in U.S. deposits, to Morgan Stanley with close to zero. They are all "too big to fail" and so free to trade as they please—on the taxpayer dime.
The conventional wisdom as perpetuated in the media is that these bailout mechanisms are unique, designed to ameliorate a once-in-a-lifetime financial "perfect storm." They are unique, but only in size. A quick look back at the past three decades will demonstrate what Mr. Forstmann meant when he said the government has been ready to hand out free money nearly every time risk-taking led to losses.
The first mortgage market meltdown of the mid-1980s, spurred by the Fed's supply of easy money, was among the most painful market upheavals in the history of the bond market. The pioneers of the mortgage bond market, Lew Ranieri of Salomon Brothers and Larry Fink of First Boston (the same Larry Fink now considered a sage CEO at money management powerhouse BlackRock), lost what were then unheard-of sums of money. (Mr. Fink concedes to losses of over $100 million.)
"What happened then was a dry run of what was to come," Mr. Fink recently told me, as he looked back on the market he created, which would eventually lie at the heart of the most recent financial crisis. Wall Street took excessive risk in mortgage bonds amid the easy money supplied by the Fed—and lost. When the crisis began, the Fed under then Chairman Alan Greenspan slashed interest rates—as it would do after Orange County, Calif., declared bankruptcy in 1994 because of bad bets on complex bonds; and again in 1998 when the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) blew up; and of course in the bond-market crisis of 2007 and 2008. The lower rates each time lessened the pain of the risk-taking gone awry, and opened the door for increased risk down the line.
Easy money wasn't the only way government induced the bubble. The mortgage-bond market was the mechanism by which policy makers transformed home ownership into something that must be earned into something close to a civil right. The Community Reinvestment Act and projects by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, beginning in the Clinton years, couldn't have been accomplished without the mortgage bond—which allowed banks to offload the increasingly risky mortgages to Wall Street, which in turn securitized them into triple-A rated bonds thanks to compliant ratings agencies.
The perversity of these efforts wasn't merely that bonds packed with subprime loans received such high ratings. It was also that by inducing homeownership, the government was itself making homeownership less affordable. Because families without the real economic means to repay traditional 30-year mortgages were getting them, housing prices grew to artificially high levels.
This is where the real sin of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac comes into play. Both were created by Congress to make housing affordable to the middle class. But when they began guaranteeing subprime loans, they actually began pricing out the working class from the market until the banking business responded with ways to make repayment of mortgages allegedly easier through adjustable rates loans that start off with low payments. But these loans, fully sanctioned by the government, were a ticking time bomb, as we're all now so painfully aware.
A similar bomb exploded in 1998, when LTCM blew up. The policy response to the LTCM debacle is instructive; more than anything else it solidified Wall Street's belief that there were little if any real risks to risk-taking. With $5 billion under management, LTCM was deemed too big to fail because, with nearly every major firm copying its money losing trades, much of Wall Street might have failed with it.
That's what the policy makers told us anyway. On Wall Street there's general agreement that the implosion of LTCM would have tanked one of the biggest risk takers in the market, Lehman Brothers, a full decade before its historic bankruptcy filing. Officials at Merrill, including its then-CFO (and future CEO) Stan O'Neal, believed Merrill's risk-taking in esoteric bonds could have led to a similar implosion 10 years before its calamitous merger with Bank of America.
We'll never know if LTCM's demise would have tanked the financial system or simply tanked a couple of firms that bet wrong. But one thing is certain: A valuable lesson in risk-taking was lost. By 2007, the years of excessive risk-taking, aided and abetted by the belief that the government was ready to paper over mistakes, had taken their toll.
With so much easy money, with the government always ready to ease their pain, Wall Street developed new and even more innovative ways to make money through risk-taking. The old mortgage bonds created by Messrs. Fink and Ranieri as simple securitized pools had morphed into the so-called collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), complex structures that allowed Wall Street banks as well as quasi-governmental agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to securitize ever riskier mortgages.
Mr. O'Neal, the man considered most responsible for Merrill's disastrous foray into risk-taking, told me in an interview last year that in the fall of 2007, when he saw that the firm's problems were insurmountable, he had a deal to sell Merrill to Bank of America for around $90 a share. But Merrill's board rejected it, believing he would be selling out cheaply. The CDOs would eventually recover, they argued, as the Fed pumped life into the markets.
Likewise, nearly to the minute he was forced to file for bankruptcy, former Lehman CEO Dick Fuld believed the government wouldn't let Lehman die. After all, government largess had always been there in the past.
All of which brings me back to Mr. Fortsmann's comment about policy makers helping turn a cold into cancer. What if the Fed hadn't eased Wall Street's pain in the late 1980s, and again after the 1994 bond-market collapse? What if policy makers in 1998 had allowed the markets to feel the consequences of risk—allowing LTCM to fail, and letting Lehman Brothers and possibly Merrill Lynch die as well?
There would have been pain—lots of it—for Wall Street and even for Main Street, but a lot less than what we're experiencing today. Wall Street would have learned a valuable lesson: There are consequences to risk.
Mr. Gasparino is a CNBC on-air editor and the author, most recently, of "The Sellout: How Three Decades of Wall Street Greed and Government Mismanagement Destroyed the Global Financial System," just published by HarperBusiness.
Sunday, November 22, 2009
Fall of the Republic
It is happening before our very eyes. Obama is not interested in helping the poor or the middle class. This film exposes exactly who he is working for. Please watch it and learn for yourself. Citizens of the US must stand up and do what we can to stop the enslaving of the world. Were you born to be the slave of the government? You have seen the looting of our treasury. The US has produced more wealth than any country in history. Not because we are the same as the others - because we were different. But now we are almost back to where we were when we freed ourselves from British rule. When we revolted it was the first time in history that rights were deemed to be given by God - not the government. We now live in a time when that very foundation of our country, the freedom and liberty that made us great, has been dismantled.
Do you have time to get informed? Don't be fooled. Please take a few minutes out of your day and watch this well produced film. While I can't attest to every detail being exactly true, the overall message is right on the money. Did I say money? Oh yes kids - it is, and always has been about the money. They want it, they are getting it, and they want more. Please watch:
Do you have time to get informed? Don't be fooled. Please take a few minutes out of your day and watch this well produced film. While I can't attest to every detail being exactly true, the overall message is right on the money. Did I say money? Oh yes kids - it is, and always has been about the money. They want it, they are getting it, and they want more. Please watch:
Friday, November 20, 2009
Germany warns US on market bubbles
By Ralph Atkins in Frankfurt / Financial Times
Published: November 20 2009 19:48
Last updated: November 20 2009 19:48
Germany’s new finance minister has echoed Chinese warnings about the growing threat of fresh global asset price bubbles, fuelled by low US interest rates and a weak dollar.
Wolfgang Schäuble’s comments highlight official concern in Europe that the risk of further financial market turbulence has been exacerbated by the exceptional steps taken by central banks and governments to combat the crisis.
Last weekend, Liu Mingkang, China’s banking regulator, criticised the US Federal Reserve for fuelling the “dollar carry-trade”, in which investors borrow dollars at ultra-low interest rates and invest in higher-yielding assets abroad.
EDITOR’S CHOICE
In depth: Dollar under pressure - Nov-20Editorial Comment: Deficit attention - Nov-20View from the Top: Robert Zoellick - Nov-20Long View: Fears of US double-dip recession - Nov-20Lex: Bernanke blowing bubbles - Nov-17China says Fed policy threatens global recovery - Nov-16Speaking at a banking conference in Frankfurt on Friday, Mr Schäuble said it would be “naive” to assume the next asset price bubble would take the same guise as the last.
He said: “More likely today is a scenario in which excess liquidity globally creates a new [sort of] asset market bubble.”
He added: “That low interest rate currencies such as the US dollar are increasingly being used as a basis for currency carry trades should give pause for thought. If there was a sudden reversal in this business, markets would be threatened with enormous turbulence, including in foreign exchange markets.”
Mr Schäuble, a political veteran, took over the German finance ministry after Angela Merkel began her second term as chancellor last month.
Currencies in context
Interactive chart showing the dollar in the context of current market trends
His comments reflect the concern of European policymakers that the continent will bear the brunt of a global adjustment process through a stronger euro.
Further signs of official frustration about policy steps being taken elsewhere came from Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, a European Central Bank executive.
He said in a speech in Paris on Friday that emerging Asian economies were continuing “strongly accommodative monetary policies” in spite of their faster economic recoveries.
Although Mr Bini Smaghi did not mention the euro or the eurozone, he warned that delays in implementing an “exit [strategy] by the countries that are ahead in the cyclical upturn creates distortions and encourages other countries to delay their exit, thus further adding to the imbalances and making the exit more difficult for everybody”.
Separately, Jean-Claude Trichet, ECB president, issued his strongest warning yet that banks must control pay and bonuses.
Striking a noticeably stiffer tone, Mr Trichet told the Frankfurt conference: “Profits earned should be used, as a priority, to build capital and reserves, rather than be paid out as dividends or excessive compensation.”
The ECB president quoted a warning by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Frankfurt’s most famous son, on the need for self-restraint: “If I wanted to lavishly let myself go, I could well destroy myself and my environment.”
Mr Trichet said: “Compensation and bonuses must remain contained. Otherwise, we would take risks that Goethe [has] already described.”
Published: November 20 2009 19:48
Last updated: November 20 2009 19:48
Germany’s new finance minister has echoed Chinese warnings about the growing threat of fresh global asset price bubbles, fuelled by low US interest rates and a weak dollar.
Wolfgang Schäuble’s comments highlight official concern in Europe that the risk of further financial market turbulence has been exacerbated by the exceptional steps taken by central banks and governments to combat the crisis.
Last weekend, Liu Mingkang, China’s banking regulator, criticised the US Federal Reserve for fuelling the “dollar carry-trade”, in which investors borrow dollars at ultra-low interest rates and invest in higher-yielding assets abroad.
EDITOR’S CHOICE
In depth: Dollar under pressure - Nov-20Editorial Comment: Deficit attention - Nov-20View from the Top: Robert Zoellick - Nov-20Long View: Fears of US double-dip recession - Nov-20Lex: Bernanke blowing bubbles - Nov-17China says Fed policy threatens global recovery - Nov-16Speaking at a banking conference in Frankfurt on Friday, Mr Schäuble said it would be “naive” to assume the next asset price bubble would take the same guise as the last.
He said: “More likely today is a scenario in which excess liquidity globally creates a new [sort of] asset market bubble.”
He added: “That low interest rate currencies such as the US dollar are increasingly being used as a basis for currency carry trades should give pause for thought. If there was a sudden reversal in this business, markets would be threatened with enormous turbulence, including in foreign exchange markets.”
Mr Schäuble, a political veteran, took over the German finance ministry after Angela Merkel began her second term as chancellor last month.
Currencies in context
Interactive chart showing the dollar in the context of current market trends
His comments reflect the concern of European policymakers that the continent will bear the brunt of a global adjustment process through a stronger euro.
Further signs of official frustration about policy steps being taken elsewhere came from Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, a European Central Bank executive.
He said in a speech in Paris on Friday that emerging Asian economies were continuing “strongly accommodative monetary policies” in spite of their faster economic recoveries.
Although Mr Bini Smaghi did not mention the euro or the eurozone, he warned that delays in implementing an “exit [strategy] by the countries that are ahead in the cyclical upturn creates distortions and encourages other countries to delay their exit, thus further adding to the imbalances and making the exit more difficult for everybody”.
Separately, Jean-Claude Trichet, ECB president, issued his strongest warning yet that banks must control pay and bonuses.
Striking a noticeably stiffer tone, Mr Trichet told the Frankfurt conference: “Profits earned should be used, as a priority, to build capital and reserves, rather than be paid out as dividends or excessive compensation.”
The ECB president quoted a warning by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Frankfurt’s most famous son, on the need for self-restraint: “If I wanted to lavishly let myself go, I could well destroy myself and my environment.”
Mr Trichet said: “Compensation and bonuses must remain contained. Otherwise, we would take risks that Goethe [has] already described.”
Labels:
Germany warning,
market bubble,
stock market
Complete destruction of the U.S. economy
The Healthcare Reform Travesty by Alan Caruba
Other than the complete destruction of the U.S. economy, one sixth of which is generated by the healthcare profession, I cannot see any reason for the bill that Harry Reid is pushing for a Saturday evening vote in the Senate
It has taken less than a year for the Democrats, led by Barack Obama, to saddle Americans with such enormous debt that your grandchildren will be paying it off. The so-called “bail-outs” have proven to be a bonanza for Wall Street firms on good terms with the Secretary of the Treasury, Tim Geithner, whose mantra is “It’s all Bush’s fault.” The “stimulus” bill has not stimulated anything except lies about “jobs created and saved.”
Rush Limbaugh calls Congress a “Kamakazi Congress” and the “Suicide Bomber Congress” because it is obvious that any Democrat Congressman or woman and any Senator who votes for this atrocious bill, probably without having read it, will be thrown out of office. And should be!
Ignoring all the town hall protests, the tea parties across the nation, and the massive September 12 rally in Washington, D.C. has to come with a penalty, but by then it will be too late for most Americans.
The November 23 edition of Business Week had a cover story by Catherine Arnst titled “Why Wait for Health Reform: Ten Ways to Cut Costs Right Now.” It makes clear that all the so-called reforms contained in the 2,000-plus page bill could be achieved in ways that do not require a monster piece of legislation intended to impose socialized medicine on America.
In brief, here how to achieve an improved, and more affordable healthcare system:
Crack down on fraud and abuse
The amount of fraud in the Medicare system is estimated to cost $125-175 billion every year. Since the system operates as a kind of honor code, the government has been unsuccessful in detecting fraud and abuse. Meanwhile, private insurers such as the Blue Cross & Blue Shield Association report its anti-fraud efforts resulted in a savings of $350 million last year, a 43% increase from 2007.
Develop a healthy workforce
Wellness programs pay real dividends for the companies that sponsor them.
Coordinate care through family doctors
A patient suffering from one or more chronic diseases may depend on several doctors and “rarely do they communicate with one another.” This results in waste, often due to duplication of treatments. By designating a primary care doctor to organize care with specialists, pharmacists, and physical therapists, sharing medical records electronically, it is estimated that $250 to $325 billion could be saved.
Make health a community effort
Campaigns to encourage people to eat better, get more exercise, and other options could greatly reduce health-related costs.
Stop infections in hospitals
Every year, 1.7 million patients develop infections while in hospital and 99,000 die as a result. They can be reduced if hospitals put more emphasis on solving the problem.
Get patients to take their medicine
Three out of four Americans do not take their medicine as directed. Noncompliance leads to more doctor visits, hospitalizations, and treatments that add an estimated $177 billion a year to the nation’s health-care bill.
Discuss options near the end of life
End of life care can be especially costly. When patients and the families are informed they can choose pain management, nursing care, and psychological support, all of which reduce costs.
Use insurance to manage chronic disease
In 2009, UnitedHealthcare introduced a Diabetes Health Plan that offers rewards to patients who manage their disease properly. The idea is to contain costs by giving patients financial incentives based on their particular health issues rather than a one-size-fits-all approach…something the proposed healthcare reform will impose on all Americans regardless of their particular health problems.
Let well-informed patients decide
Too many Americans think that drastic surgery and other procedures are the only way they can survive a healthcare crisis, but such procedures extend lives or prevent heart attacks in only a tiny minority of especially sick patients. Few really know this. Educating patients can reduce wasted health spending by up to 37%.
Apologize to the patient
When hospitals reveal mistakes to patients and their families, investigate the cause, and offer a settlement, it takes the lawyers out of the process. Honesty really is the best policy.
Instead, Congress is getting ready to impose a massive bureaucracy that will be put in charge of healthcare, increasing the nation’s deficit and debt as millions are added to the Medicare ranks and private insurance companies are driven out of business. The loss of freedom will be beyond calculation as Americans must deal with bureaucrats instead of their physicians and other healthcare professionals.
It is the worst possible “reform” imaginable. We’re running out of time to call our Senators, mostly Democrats, and demand they vote NO!
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Alan Caruba Most recent columns
Alan has a daily blog called Warning Signs. His latest book is Right Answers: Separating Fact from Fantasy.
Alan can be reached at acaruba@aol.com
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